THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC REASONING IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
IN DEFENSE OF THE
PATHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE
VINCENT BLASI*

I am indebted to Professor Christie, not only for noticing my work
but also for challenging it in so forthright a manner. He has identified a
feature of my thesis that deserves to be a focal point for additional debate. Any reader of my original article who was undecided whether to
agree with it ought to be aided considerably in the task of critical evaluation by the exchange Professor Christie has initiated. I know my own
understanding of the premises and implications of my thesis has been
enhanced by the experience of working out a response to his challenge.
The crux of Professor Christie's critique is contained in the following passages: "The notion I find most troublesome in Blasi's argument is
that, in deciding individual cases, courts must constantly keep in mind
strategic considerations." 1 "I find it a disturbing suggestion that a person's legal claim should stand or fall, not on the strength of his argument, but on some strategic view taken by the Court or on the
background views of some member of the Court regarding what is good
for society."'2 I take his claim to be that strategic considerations have no
place in the process of constitutional interpretation, or at least that the
particular strategic considerations that I think should be taken into account have no proper place. He views the use I make of strategic consid'3
erations as inconsistent with "the ideal of the rule of law."
I believe strategic thinking has a limited but vital role to play in the
development of a constitutional tradition. I do not believe that a properly limited concern for strategic considerations is inconsistent with the
ideal of the rule of law; indeed, I think such a concern for strategy serves
the rule of law. I agree with Professor Christie that constitutional inter* Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia Law School. B.A., 1964, Northwestern University; J.D., 1967, University of Chicago.
1. Christie, Why the First Amendment Should Not Be Interpreted From the PathologicalPerspective: A Response to Professor Blasi, 1986 DUKE L.J. 683, 689 [hereinafter Christie, Response].
2. Id. at 690.
3. Id. at 695.
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pretation, at least when undertaken by the judiciary, must have the quality of law. I agree also that constitutional adjudication would lose the
quality of law were it to become in essence "the same thing as politics" or
"the same thing as the search for moral perfection."'4 The question that
divides us most sharply is whether the type of strategic thinking I advocate, which seems to me quite selective and quite structured, is likely to
corrupt judicial reasoning to the point where the distinction between law
and politics or law and the search for moral perfection is lost.
My starting point is the view that "[t]he first task of any system of
constitutional limitations is to guarantee that the truly fundamental features of the framework of government are maintained." 5 I note how this
very general function of constitutionalism can be broken down into numerous distinct objectives 6 that vary widely in theoretical import but
share an important practical feature: "Whether constitutional provisions
are invoked to protect political minorities, break political deadlocks,
raise the level of public debate to a more idealistic plane, or serve any of
the other possible objectives of constitutionalism, the relative continuity
and stability of the constitutional tradition is likely to have a major impact on the success of the endeavor." '7 That observation concerning
functional effectiveness is based on a series of strategic calculations:
Only relatively stable principles are likely to be perceived by divergent
political factions as potentially working to their advantage in the long
run. Only relatively stable principles are likely to be viewed as worthy
of a certain respect simply on account of their capacity to endure.
Only if the expositors of constitutional principles avoid being dominated by the political alignments and passions of the present can those
whose preferences are backed by force of arms or popular approval be
take a long-term view about the nature of political
expected to
8
obligation.
9
Professor Christie shares my preference for stability and continuity,
but apparently not my derivation of that preference from strategic judgments. Presumably, he values stability and continuity because he finds
those qualities constitutive elements of law or essential preconditions for
4. Id. at 690.
5. Blasi, The PathologicalPerspectiveand the FirstAmendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 45253 (1985).
6. See id. at 453.
7. Id. at 454.
8. Id.
9. Although he does not endorse stability and continuity in so many words, I regard his overriding concern for "objectivity" and "consistency," see Christie, Response, supra note 1, at 694, to
carry an implicit endorsement of stability and continuity. In the article on which he explicitly builds
the present critique, Professor Christie accords a central place in his analysis to the search for "the
fixed reference points of legal reasoning." See Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1311,
1326 (1969) [hereinafter Christie, Objectivity].
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the effective participation of the parties in the adjudicative process. 10 If
these speculations on my part are incorrect or incomplete, and if, for
example, he values stability and continuity of doctrine in part because
those qualities help to constrain the antidemocratic and potentially dangerous power of judges, then he would be guilty of the same type of strategic reasoning that informs my preference for stability and continuity.
Having decided, on strategic grounds, that stability and continuity
are important qualities of a constitutional tradition, I proceed to distinguish the core commitments of such a tradition from the surrounding
elements and to search for methodologies and doctrines that maximize
the prospect that those core commitments will remain vital through the
vicissitudes of political experience. Again, the effort to identify such a
core is inspired by a strategic judgment: given the irresistible and often
salutary pressures toward dynamism in the development of a constitutional tradition, the cause of stability is served if certain value propositions that are part of that tradition are separated from the rest and
viewed as relatively (though not totally) immune from reinterpretation or
abandonment.
I should emphasize that although my embrace of the concept of core
commitments stems in part from strategic considerations, my specification of precisely what propositions constitute the core of the first amendment (or of any other constitutional provision) does not derive, even in
part, from any sort of strategic calculation. My test of pedigree for inclusion in the core is actual acceptance over time by the legal and political
culture.1 1 That is the antithesis of a test based on conformity with a
particular political philosophy, or search for moral perfection, or instrumental judgment regarding how one or more primary values might be
served. Because of my positivistic conception of the core, the value commitments I take to constitute the core of the first amendment "tend to be
simple, discrete, situation-oriented, and accessible." 1 2 Most of them are
"relatively specific in nature."1 3 If this stage of my proposed method of
constitutional reasoning does not have the quality of law, it is not due to
the corrupting influence of strategic calculation or perfectionist moral
philosophizing.
Professor Christie, however, appears to find in my specification of
the core of the first amendment a good deal more picking and choosing
than can be countenanced by the foregoing account. He notes that I do
not include certain doctrines, the protection of commercial advertising
10.
11.
12.
13.

See Christie, Objectivity, supra note 9, at 1329-30.
See Blasi, supra note 5, at 459-62.
Id. at 460.
Id.
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for example, that have been adopted in recent years by the Supreme
Court.14 He claims that I have abandoned "the historical perspective,"
given too much emphasis to political speech, and included too many
propositions that are "of very late genesis."' I5 The result, he believes, is
that the core of the first amendment that forms the cornerstone of my
theory of constitutional interpretation exists only "in the eyes of the
6
beholder."'
That is a charge I take very seriously, because if he is right my thesis
cannot be defended. Of course, were Professor Christie to convince me
not that the concept of the core is untenable but only that I have misjudged what ought to be included in the core, the thesis would not be
discredited. I would simply have to revise my view of what doctrinal
implications follow from adoption of the pathological perspective in light
of the new understanding of the content of the core. (I doubt whether
my views regarding methodological implications would have to be
altered.)
I do not share Professor Christie's view that the core propositions I
invoke are mostly of very late genesis. In the portion of my article that
he quotes on this point, I cite several cases in support of each of the core
propositions I identify. I cite several cases for each proposition because I
believe acceptance over time by the legal culture is a prerequisite for recognition as a core commitment. The process of validation I have in mind
ordinarily entails acceptance in a variety of settings and a pattern of
steady development by which the core proposition comes to figure increasingly as a reference point for reasoning about first amendment
problems. Thus, some of the cases I cite are recent. But each core proposition I identify also finds support in cases that are not so recent. The
dates of the earliest cases cited for the eleven core propositions I identify
are respectively: 1931, 1957,'1949, 1939, 1943, 1957, 1961, 1931, 1959,
1925, and 1927.17 I do not claim that the core propositions I have identified were fully crystallized by those dates. Nor do I deny that subsequent
recognition and development was essential to the emergence of those
core propositions as central features of the first amendment tradition.
My point is that the core propositions that I discern in the first amendment tradition are not of "very late genesis," and do not represent simply
a selective list of my favorite contemporary doctrines and principles. I
claim to have derived the core of the first amendment from a reading of
history.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Christie, Response, supra note 1, at 687-88.
Id.
Id. at 688.
See Blasi, supra note 5, at 460-61 & nn.15-25.
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Professor Christie is unsympathetic to this claim partly because he
believes that one who adopts a "historical perspective" must emphasize
original history, in the sense of the intentions of the framers of the first
amendment, rather than the intervening, ongoing history of adjudication
and professional commentary.1 8 He then finds merit in a reading of the
framers' intentions that makes the first amendment into a provision more
about federalism than liberty, and concludes that this original history'
does not support my contention that the core of the first amendment
consists of a configuration of propositions about liberty of expression and
belief.19
I think he is wrong, even granting his premise that original history is
the history that matters the most. Recent scholarship has cast much
doubt on the familiar thesis of Professor Levy that the framers of the first
amendment had a narrow, legalistic, Blackstonian understanding of the
meaning of freedom of speech. 20 Of course, it is entirely possible, as Professor Van Alstyne has suggested, 2 1 that many of the framers had a
grand view of the freedom of speech but expected the first amendment to
constrain only the federal government, trusting to state constitutions to
preserve that essential liberty against infringement by state and local governments. If so, one who advocates a narrow reading of the federal constitution's protection for freedom of speech on grounds of original
history must show that the intentions of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment were also narrow, that a robust right to freedom of speech
was not one of the privileges and immunities of citizens or one of the
guarantees of due process protected against state encroachment by that
amendment.
I take issue with Professor Christie's reading of original history, but
I do so gingerly because I have no confidence in anyone's-my own, Professor Christie's, Professor Levy's, Justice Black's- capacity to reconstruct what the framers intended. To my mind, the critiques of that
interpretive methodology offered in recent years by Professors Brest,
18. See Christie, Response, supra note 1, at 687-88.
19. See id.

20. See Anderson, The Originsof the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983); Mayton,
Seditious Libel and the Lost Guaranteeof a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984);
Rabban, The AhistoricalHistorian: LeonardLevy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985). Professor Levy's thesis is set out in L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A
FREE PRESS (1985), a revision of L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960). Professor Levy has responded to Professor Anderson
in Levy, On the Originsof the Free Press Clause, 32 UCLA L. REV. 177 (1984), and to Professor
Mayton in Levy, The Legacy Reexamined, 37 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1985).
21. See Van Alstyne, CongressionalPower and Free Speech: Levys Legacy Revisited (Book
Review), 99 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1097 (1986).
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Dworkin, and Sandalow are unanswerable. 2 2
Perhaps Professor Christie would answer me in kind. He might take
issue with my reading of the intervening history of adjudication and public debate regarding the meaning of the first amendment. He might compile a different list of core propositions, citing different case holdings,
different flights of rhetoric from different judges, different scholarly com"mentaries, and different assumptions articulated in public debate. I do
not deny that the evolving tradition of the first amendment can be read in
various ways: "[T]o give meaning to any text or event we cannot help
'23
but draw upon our own values, perceptions, and focal mechanisms.
But I would argue that fair-minded interpretors of intervening history
are likely to agree more than fair-minded interpretors of original history
because the first group of interpretors are working with materials to
which they have a closer and more vital connection. We live and work at
the tail end of the line of growth that constitutes our first amendment
tradition. The effort to trace that line of growth is a more meaningful
endeavor than is the effort to reconstruct a snapshot of one moment in
the remote past.
I am particularly confident that the process of interpreting intervening history can have integrity when the inquiry concerns not the furthest
reaches of the tradition but the core. I cannot imagine, for example, that
any fair-minded interpretor of the first amendment tradition would dismiss or ignore the Holmes opinion in Abrams v. United States,24 the
Brandeis opinion in Whitney v. California,25 or the majority opinions in
Near v. Minnesota,2 6 Bridges v. California,2 7 and New York Times v. Sullivan.28 Fair-minded interpretors no doubt would disagree about
whether cases such as Thornhill v. Alabama 29 or Dennis v. United
States3 0 remain a vital part of the first amendment tradition, or whether
Buckley v. Valeo 31 or Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council 32 have yet proven their capacity to endure. In the
22. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204
(1980); Dworkin, The Forum ofPrinciple,56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981), reprintedin R. DWORKIN,
A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 33 (1985); Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation, 79 MICH. L. REv.
1033 (1981).
23. Blasi, supra note 5, at 454-55.
24. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
25. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
26. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
27. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29. 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (labor picketing).

30. 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (conspiracy by close-knit group to advocate revolution).
31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (campaign financing).
32. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial advertising).
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highly charged area of obscenity, I think fair-minded interpretors would
agree that the closest thing to a core proposition recognized by the first
amendment tradition is the rejection of thematic obscenity (the regulation of sexual ideas, such as the propriety of adultery, as contrasted with
sexual imagery), first accomplished in Kingsley Pictures v. Board of Regents 33 and treated as a standard reference point ever since. I cannot
imagine a group of fair-minded interpretors agreeing on what to make of
the welter of cases since Roth v. United States 34 dealing with patent offensiveness, redeeming social value, child pornography, and claims to enjoy pornographic materials in private.3 5 At the periphery, the first
amendment tradition, like any other tradition, is so indeterminate that
one has to believe interpretors of the tradition draw heavily on their personal preferences or philosophies in rendering their interpretations. At
the core of the tradition, in contrast, the personal element in the process
of interpretation need not dominate the enterprise.
Professor Christie does not regard as central to his critique his challenge to my claim that the core propositions of the first amendment tradition can be identified by an interpretive process, looking to intervening
rather than original history, that has integrity. Ironically, I think his
challenge is more threatening to my thesis than he does, because I agree
with him that constitutional interpretation should not be dominated by
either strategic calculation or personal philosophizing. I am at pains to
prove that strategic reasoning plays only a carefully confined role in my
proposed method of constitutional interpretation. The derivation of the
core is one of the important stages of constitutional analysis at which I
think judges should eschew all strategic calculation.
In contrast, the strategic point of view should, I believe, inform the
choice of interpretive methodologies for ruling upon the vast array of
first amendment claims that courts are required to decide. In order best
to preserve and nurture the core propositions of the first amendment, I
urge courts to emphasize and glorify historical benchmarks, 36 to invoke
simple precepts regarding expressive liberty,3 7 to integrate complex
strands of analysis into relatively concise principles, 3 8 to avoid indiscriminate innovation, 39 to keep the ambit of first amendment concern within
33. 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959).
34. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
35. See, e.g., W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 709-40 (6th ed. 1986).
36. Blasi, supra note 5, at 469.
37. Id. at 472. One colleague refers to this proposal as my "mantra" theory of the first
amendment.
38. Id. at 473-74.
39. Id. at 476.
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bounds that comport with popular understanding, 4° and to construct
doctrines that can take account of certain destabilizing social phenomena.4 1 One could, of course, accept or reject any of these methodological
recommendations on some basis other than strategic efficacy, but my reason for preferring them is unashamedly strategic.
Here, I gather, is where Professor Christie is especially out of sympathy with my thesis. He favors a method of constitutional interpretation that is based on "proofs and arguments put forward by the
parties"; 42 he views this emphasis on the parties as central to the "model
of consistency" he developed in his well-known 1969 article.4 3 Were
courts to favor the methodologies I recommend as a strategy to combat
pathologies, the result would be just another example of judicial reasoning "on the basis of some preconceived idea of what is good for the country, or the world, or the universe, or on the basis of some prudential
strategy of judicial decisionmaking." 44 He states his cardinal tenet succinctly: "[T]he correct decision in any particular case must be one that is
primarily determined by the dynamics of the legal argument in that particular case rather than by a theory of the good encompassing the whole
'4 5
of society."
I am not certain exactly what Professor Christie means by "proofs
and arguments put forward by the parties" and a judicial decision "primarily determined by the dynamics of the legal argument in that particular case." Under the method of constitutional interpretation that I
propose, parties certainly would make proofs and arguments regarding
whether their claims fall within or without the precepts and principles of
the first amendment tradition. The parties would argue about whether
the classic benchmarks of the tradition are analogous to the case before
the court. I envision situation-specific arguments over such phenomena
as the chilling effect. In fact, several of the methodological priorities that
are indicated by the pathological perspective-the emphasis on historical
benchmarks, the careful attention given to formulating principles, the
cautious approach to doctrinal innovation-ought to enhance the role of
the parties to a lawsuit by giving them reference points for argumentation that are more accessible and more stable than the reference points
provided by our current constitutional jurisprudence. I would understand Professor Christie's objection had I proposed a method of constitu40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 478-79.
Id. at 482-84.
Christie, Response, supra note 1, at 694.
Christie, Objectivity, supra note 9, at 1333-41.
Christie, Response, supra note 1, at 694.
Id.
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tional interpretation in which judges decided cases by first imagining that
they occurred amidst a social pathology of repression and then rendering
ad hoe judgments based not on previously established legal doctrines but
rather prudential assessments of how best to combat the hypothesized
pathology. But that is a far cry from the method I spelled out in my
article.
Thus, I am curious what types of "proofs and arguments" would
figure in Professor Christie's model of consistency that do not figure in
my preferred method of constitutional interpretation. From his 1969 article it appears he would make more use of the analytical device of paradigm cases than do most contemporary judges.4 6 So would I, at least
regarding the core propositions of the first amendment tradition. It is
clear both from the 1969 article and the current response that Professor
Christie wishes to reduce the roles of personal judicial preference and
perfectionist moral theory in the process of constitutional interpretation. 47 So do I. In my article I search for ways to avoid the type of
doctrinal complexity that is exemplified by "a multi-factor balancing test,
a multi-stage analysis with a threshold level-of-scrutiny determination, or
a standard that is highly dependent on particularistic assessments of motive, risk, and efficiency." '48 As I understand his model of consistency,
Professor Christie ought also to be troubled by a system that requires the
parties to fashion their "proofs and arguments" in such a morass of doctrinal complexity. On the surface, there would seem to be a good deal of
overlap in the methodological and doctrinal implications of our respective approaches to constitutional adjudication.
I can only conclude that the real difference between us is that I derive my methodological and doctrinal preferences from strategic calculation informed by the pathological perspective and he derives his
preferences-for the use of paradigm cases, for example, or for a high
level of constitutional protection for commercial advertising-from a
nonstrategic mode of reasoning. This difference could be important for
either of two reasons. First, Professor Christie may believe it is simply
wrong in principle for courts to employ strategic reasoning at any stage
of the process of formulating constitutional doctrine. Second, he may
believe that if strategic reasoning is legitimated at the stage when methodological and doctrinal priorities are determined, courts will inevitably
lapse into a strategic mode of thought when it comes time to apply the
strategically derived methodologies and doctrines to particular disputes.
46. See Christie, Objectivity, supra note 9, at 1333-41.
47. See id. at 1330-31; Christie, Response, supra note 1, at 690, 692.
48. Blasi, supra note 5, at 473.
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On the first point, I must confess to a certain skepticism regarding
whether it is even possible to expunge strategic considerations from all
stages of constitutional analysis. As suggested above, I would be surprised if Professor Christie's preference for stability and continuity of
doctrine were not derived in part from a strategic calculation about how
best to constrain the power of judges. I would be surprised if his insistence that judges always respond explicitly to all contentions put forth by
the parties49 were not derived in part from the strategic calculation that
judges so obligated are less likely to engage in the type of doctrinal innovation he dislikes. I would be surprised if his belief that racial preferences are unconstitutional per se, without regard to which race is
disadvantaged and what motivations inform the use of racial criteria,50
were not derived in part from the strategic calculation that the paramount task of reducing discrimination against minority races is likely to
be best served if whites see the constitutional principle regarding the use
of racial criteria as sometimes working to their advantage as well; perceived asymmetry in a legal doctrine can erode respect for law even when
good reasons exist for the asymmetry. 5 ' I admit that as a matter of logic
one could derive these methodological and doctrinal preferences from
nonprudential, nonstrategic considerations, but I have my doubts
whether as a matter of actual practice one is likely to eschew strategic
reasoning at this stage of the legal reasoning process.
In any event, I do not comprehend what is improper in principle
about strategic reasoning when confined as I have tried to confine it. The
term "strategic" may conjure up images of clandestine game plans or
adversarial plotting or militaristic ruthlessness, but what it means in essence to have a strategy is to consider explicitly and/or systematically
how best to achieve one's objectives. As Professor Christie recognizes,
the term carries connotations of prudence and pragmatic judgment, and
surely those qualities have a respected place in legal reasoning. Of
course, strategy is always in the service of seeking to achieve objectives,
and thus a strategic point of view presupposes an instrumental, goal-oriented point of view. And I admit that instrumentalism can play too large
a role in legal reasoning, and probably has in the postwar period. But I
have paid a good deal of attention to the task of marking out only a
limited ambit for strategic reasoning. In the method of constitutional
interpretation I advocate, strategic reasoning has no role to play in deter49. See Christie, Objectivity, supra note 9, at 1329-30; Christie, Response, supra note 1, at 69394.
50. Christie, Response, supra note 1, at 692.
51. For a detailed account of why I believe good reasons exist for the asymmetry, see Blasi,
Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 21, 36-61 (1979).
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mining what propositions constitute the core of the first amendment.
Nor do I encourage judges to invoke strategic considerations when applying to particular fact situations whatever methodologies and doctrines
are thought best to serve the primary objective of safeguarding and
strengthening the core of the first amendment.
In short, the limited use I make of the strategic point of view seems
fully consonant with the ideal of the rule of law. The priority I accord
the objective of safeguarding core constitutional commitments may be
disputable on theoretical grounds, but if that priority is defensible in
terms of the theory of constitutionalism, I do not believe my effort to
implement the priority in a strategically effective manner violates any
significant norms or traditions of legal reasoning.
There remains a practical objection implicit in Professor Christie's
critique, and I cannot help but believe that his deepest concern with my
thesis relates to this practical point. Although I advocate that judges
keep strategic reasoning to a minimum when applying established doctrines and methodologies to particular cases, is there not a serious risk
that the strategic mentality will spill over to and corrupt such judgments
of application? If that were to happen, the claims of law and equity peculiar to the parties before the court could be dwarfed by systemic concerns. And there is force to the contention that the quality of law may be
lacking in a system of adjudication that treats litigants not as distinctive
bearers of legal rights and obligations but rather as adventitious objects
of judicial decisionmaking directed to long-range, large-scale ends.
This is not to suggest that a proper respect for individual litigants
requires that courts decide constitutional disputes on an ad hoc basis
without reference to past commitments or future consequences. The parties to litigation are not entitled to have their persons or experiences sensitively examined by courts: the parties are entitled to have their legal
claims sensitively examined. Those claims are based on expectations regarding how legal norms of a general character apply to particular fact
situations. One can attempt, as Professor Christie does in his 1969 article, to formulate the norms in the most concrete idiom possible-hence
his preference for paradigm cases 52-but such a move does not eliminate
the need to resolve disputes with reference to considerations of a general
character. For even if the mode of reasoning is predominantly analogical
rather than inductive or deductive, one cannot pass judgment on a
claimed analogy without having some reasons for treating certain factual
similarities and differences as relevant and others as irrelevant.
52. See Christie, Objectivity, supra note 9, at 1334-36.
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I do not understand Professor Christie to urge that disputes between
constitutional litigants be resolved solely on the basis of considerations
specific to the particular lawsuit with no reference to sources of authority
or consequences of wider scope. His own discussion of cases belies such
an interpretation. For example, he criticizes the Supreme Court for
ascribing legal significance in a defamation action to the fact that the
defendant wrote about the plaintiff to only a very limited audience and
only on a subject of private concern. 53 He criticizes the Court for ascribing legal significance in a dispute over commercial advertising to the fact
that the activity subject to the advertising prohibition was of such a nature that the government had the authority to outlaw it entirely.5 4 The
Court thought those factual features of the cases justified treating earlier
decisions protecting defamers and advertisers as not controlling. My
own inclination is to agree with the Court rather than Professor Christie
regarding the constitutional significance of the facts in question.5 5 That
particular inclination is not important, however. What is important is
that neither of us could persuade the other on this point without invoking general considerations relating to the underlying reasons for interpreting the first amendment to protect defamatory and commercial
speech. He no doubt would want to invoke different kinds of general
considerations than I would, but both of us would have to look well beyond the parties in order to accept or reject the distinctions on which
they based their claims.
So it is not a telling point to observe that under my proposed
method of constitutional interpretation a party would sometimes lose a
case it would otherwise win were it not for the general considerations
introduced by the concern about future pathological pressures. The objection must be more narrowly focused. I take it that Professor Christie's
criticism concerns matters of degree rather than kind: because of the
legitimation of strategic thinking at other stages of the legal reasoning
process, he apparently is worried that in applying the methodologies and
53. See Christie, Response, supra note 1, at 693 (discussing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985)).
54. See id. (discussing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S.
Ct. 2968 (1986)).
55. This is not to say that I necessarily disagree with the views Professor Christie expresses
regarding which parties should have prevailed in those cases. I am inclined to believe that Dun &
Bradstreet was properly decided, although I am deeply troubled by Justice White's concurring opinion, in which he criticizes the doctrine of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Dun &
Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2948-54 (White, J., concurring). I am inclined to think the Court reached
the wrong result in Posadas, though for the reasons expressed in Justice Stevens's dissent, see
Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2986-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting), not because the majority gave weight to the
fact that the subject of the advertising ban was casino gambling as distinguished from legal services,
prescription drugs, or real estate.
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doctrines indicated by the pathological perspective courts may give too
much weight to general considerations, some of them rather speculative,
and not enough weight to the considerations of fairness and justice that
pertain peculiarly to the parties before the court.
This is a perfectly legitimate concern, though one that is difficult to
evaluate because it depends on a prediction regarding degrees of emphasis in future judicial decisionmaking. It bears repeating that I envision a
pattern of adjudication in which judges focus on the claims of individual
litigants regarding how the methodologies and doctrines formulated by
the judiciary in light of the pathological perspective apply to their specific situations. For example, the pathological perspective lends support
to a strong doctrine against prior restraint, and indicates that in deciding
what regulations of speech qualify as prior restraints courts should give
great weight to the factor of how rapidly, widely, and free from political
scrutiny the regulation can be employed.5 6 Once a doctrine and definition of prior restraint is developed, partly on the basis of strategic considerations, is there any reason to believe that in a close case judges will be
especially prone to let broad considerations of long-term strategy determine whether a particular regulation should be classified as a prior restraint? I would hope not. I would want the dominant considerations in
such a dispute to be how the particular regulation in question matches up
to the general definition of prior restraint developed in previous cases,
and how the regulation compares to previous regulations that have been
held to be prior restraints.
Of course, no close question concerning the application of a legal
standard can be resolved mechanically or semantically. If the underlying
rationale for a doctrine is partly strategic, some consideration of strategy
is likely to play a role in those judgments of application at the margin
that give shape to the doctrine itself. But this phenomenon is bound to
operate under any method of constitutional interpretation: underlying
rationales for doctrines, based on general considerations of theory or policy or systemic coherence, will figure to a degree in all close questions of
application. So long as courts give careful attention to the "proofs and
arguments put forward by the parties" regarding how those general considerations bear on the particular question of application, we do not view
the concerns of the parties as improperly subordinated. I see no special
reason to regard the parties' concerns as improperly subordinated when
the general considerations that underlie a given doctrine relate to the
strategy for combatting anticipated pathologies.
56. See Blasi, supra note 5, at 480-81.
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Perhaps there is a peculiar psychology to strategic reasoning that
does not operate for other modes of analysis that take general considerations into account. Perhaps such a psychology could lead courts that
engage in strategic thought to fail to see the parties before them or to
abuse their power in other ways. That is possible, but I await the elaboration and validation of such a psychological hypothesis by one who
shares Professor Christie's aversion to the strategic point of view. Until
then, I maintain the position that strategic reasoning has an honorable
place in the process of constitutional interpretation.

